Dominikanische Theologie nimmt ihren Ausgang bei den Menschen in ihren konkreten Lebenssituationen inmitten der Welt. Diesen Ansatz vertrat bereits Thomas von Aquin, der auf die Tradition horen und gleichzeitig auf die sozialen und politischen Verhaltnisse seiner Zeit theologisch antworten wollte. Anlasslich der Verleihung des Titels "Magister in Sacra Theologia" haben sich die Dominikaner Tiemo Rainer Peters, aus der Tradition der Neuen Politischen Theologie, und der Mediavist Walter Senner historisch und theologisch mit dem Politischen bei Thomas von Aquin (...) auseinandergesetzt und dessen Bedeutung fur die Gegenwart reflektiert. Beide gehen von ihrer eweiligen wissenschaftlichen Hermeneutik aus und damit von unterschiedlicher Seite aufeinander zu - ein ungewohnliches Unterfangen mit signifikanten Erlebnissen. (shrink)

Ziel dieses Bandes ist es, die Aktualität der Kritischen Theorie Adornos, Horkheimers und Habermas' für die heutige Zeit auszuloten. Es geht einerseits darum, die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der Kritischen Theorie neu zu überdenken, andererseits darum, neue Varianten dieser Theorie auf Gesellschaft, Kultur und Politik anzuwenden. Vor allem Bereiche wie Wissenschaftstheorie und Medienwissenschaft haben in den letzten Jahrzehnten neue Entwicklungen durchgemacht und fordern den kritischen Geist heraus. Mit Beiträgen u.a. von Roger Behrens, Wolfgang Detel, Udo Göttlich, Hans-Herbert Kögler, Gerhard Schweppenhäuser, Heinz Steinert, (...) Christine Resch und Tanja Thomas. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMit der Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen die Entscheidung eines Patienten als hinreichend autonom und sein Informed Consent damit als valide betrachtet werden darf, wird ein Kernproblem der Medizinethik an- gesprochen. In der aktuellen Literatur mehren sich in diesem Zusammenhang die Forderungen nach immer differenzierteren Aufklärungsverpflichtungen des Arztes. Dabei wird übersehen, dass diese im klinischen Alltag aufgrund der begrenzten zeitlichen und personellen Ressourcen kaum zu realisieren sind. In dieser Arbeit wird ein Konzept beschrieben, das eine bedarfsgerechte Aufklärung ermöglichen soll. Seine Leitidee (...) besteht darin, die Schwierigkeit einer Entscheidung als Maßstab für die Bestimmung der in dem jeweiligen Kontext als hinreichend geltenden Entscheidungsautonomie zu definieren. Der Schwierigkeitsbegriff wird über die der Entscheidungssituation zuzuordnenden Wertekonkurrenz, d.h. der Anzahl und dem Gewicht der eine Entscheidung mitbeeinflussenden Werte, expliziert. Auf dieser Grundlage wird ein Algorithmus entwickelt, der das Aufklärungsgespräch in Abhängigkeit von dieser Wertekonkurrenz strukturiert und dimensioniert. (shrink)

Definiton of the problem: The current literature concerning the topic of ”informed consent” confronts physicians with a growing demand for extended and sophisticated disclosure duties. Often enough they hardly seem to be feasible, not least because of an actual lack of personnel and time. The problem is to find a realisable way to balance these theoretical and practical considerations. Arguments: The fundamental idea of the concept presented here consists of using the difficulty of a certain decision as standard for determining (...) the required extent of the patient’s actual decisional autonomy. As the prominent aspect of this difficulty of decision-making, the occurrence of conflicting values – termed ”value concurrence”– is identified. Conclusion: Structuring physician-patient-communication in accordance with this ”value-concurrence” should prove to be applicable in the clinical context without neglecting important ethical reflections. (shrink)

Whereas indirect euthanasia is a common clinical practice, active euthanasia remains forbidden in most countries. The reason for this differentiation is usually seen in the principle of double-effect (PDE). PDE states that there is a morally relevant difference between the intended consequences of an action and merely foreseen, unintended side-effects. This article discloses the fundamental assumptions presenting the basis for this application of the PDE and examines whether these assumptions are compatible with the PDE. It is shown that neither a (...) liberal nor a utilitarian point of view makes the utilization of the PDE possible. In accordance with philosophical tradition, only within the doctrine of the sanctity of life does the PDE seem to be applicable. By analysing the premises of this doctrine, and comparing them with those of the PDE, the inconsistency of this idea is demonstrated. It is suggested that the role of the PDE in the current discussion on euthanasia is largely exaggerated. (shrink)

Philosophy and Kafka is a collection of original essays interrogating the relationship of literature and philosophy. The essays either discuss specific philosophical commentaries on Kafka’s work, consider the possible relevance of certain philosophical outlooks for examining Kafka’s writings, or examine Kafka’s writings in terms of a specific philosophical theme, such as communication and subjectivity, language and meaning, knowledge and truth, the human/animal divide, justice, and freedom.

AimThe neurocognitive basis of Developmental Coordination Disorder remains an issue of continued debate. This combined systematic review and meta-analysis provides a synthesis of recent experimental studies on the motor control, cognitive, and neural underpinnings of DCD.MethodsThe review included all published work conducted since September 2016 and up to April 2021. One-hundred papers with a DCD-Control comparison were included, with 1,374 effect sizes entered into a multi-level meta-analysis.ResultsThe most profound deficits were shown in: voluntary gaze control during movement; cognitive-motor integration; practice-/context-dependent (...) motor learning; internal modeling; more variable movement kinematics/kinetics; larger safety margins when locomoting, and atypical neural structure and function across sensori-motor and prefrontal regions.InterpretationTaken together, these results on DCD suggest fundamental deficits in visual-motor mapping and cognitive-motor integration, and abnormal maturation of motor networks, but also areas of pragmatic compensation for motor control deficits. Implications for current theory, future research, and evidence-based practice are discussed.Systematic Review RegistrationPROSPERO, identifier: CRD42020185444. (shrink)

There are few moral convictions that enjoy the same intuitive plausibility and level of acceptance both within and across nations, cultures, and traditions as the conviction that, normally, it is morally wrong to kill people. Attempts to provide a philosophical explanation of why that is so broadly fall into three groups: Consequentialists argue that killing is morally wrong, when it is wrong, because of the harm it inflicts on society in general, or the victim in particular, whereas personhood and human (...) dignity accounts see the wrongness of killing people in its typically involving a failure to show due respect for the victim and his or her intrinsic moral worth. I argue that none of these attempts to explain the wrongness of killing is successful. Consequentialism generates too many moral reasons to kill, cannot account for deeply felt and widely shared intuitions about the comparative wrongness of killing, and gives the wrong kind of explanation of the wrongness of killing. Personhood and human dignity accounts each draw a line that is arbitrary and entirely unremarkable in terms of empirical reality, and hence ill-suited to carry the moral weight of the difference in moral status between the individuals below and above it. Paying close attention to the different ways in which existing accounts fail to convince, I identify a number of conditions that any plausible account of the wrongness of killing must meet. I then go on to propose an account that does. I suggest that the reason that typically makes killing normal human adults wrong equally applies to atypical human beings and a wide range of non-human animals, and hence challenge the idea that killing a non-human animal is normally easier to justify than killing a human being. This idea has persisted in Western philosophy from Aristotle to the present, and even progressive moral thinkers and animal advocates such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan are committed to it. I conclude by discussing some important practical implications of my account. (shrink)

Der Band vereinigt die Vorträge der internationalen Vorlesungsreihe “Tierrechte” an der Universität Heidelberg im Sommersemester 2006. Herausgegeben von der Interdisziplinären Arbeitsgemeinschaft Tierethik (IAT) mit ihren gegenwärtigen und früheren Mitgliedern Katharina Blesch, Alexandra Breunig, Stefan Buss, Guillaume Dondainas, Rainer Ebert, Florian Fruth, Nils Kessler, Matthias Müller, Uta Panten, Anette Reimelt, Bernd Schälling, Jürgen Schneele, Adriana Sixt-Sailer, Manja Unger und Alexander Zehmisch, setzt er die mit der Vorlesungsreihe begonnenen Bemühungen um eine unvoreingenommene Vermittlung der tierethischen Forschung fort. Der Band will es (...) Lesern und Leserinnen ermöglichen, von verschiedenen Seiten Einblick in den modernen Tierrechtsdiskurs zu erhalten. Beiträge lieferten: Silke Bitz, Gieri Bolliger, Carl Cohen, Raymond Corbey, Eugen Drewermann, Mylan Engel Jr., Antoine F. Goetschel, Helmut F. Kaplan, Eisenhart von Loeper, Jörg Luy, Renate Rastätter, Tom Regan, Kurt Remele, Hanna Rheinz, Peter S. Wenz, Markus Wild, Hanno Würbel. (shrink)

Gennaro Chtjerchia, Dynamics of meaning: anaphora, presupposition, and the the of grammar. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.xv+ 270 pp, £59.95, £31.95 G. Pr...

Philosophers and ethicists have long neglected moral questions that arise from our interaction with non-human animals. Most assumed that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals, and that it is therefore morally permissible to use non-human animals as a source of food, clothing, and entertainment, and for scientific purposes. In recent decades, however, that assumption has been challenged, and the moral status of non-human animals is now the subject of a lively and controversial academic debate.Advances in sciences, (...) particularly the advent of evolutionary theory, made us realize that human beings and other animals are more similar than different, and force us to rethink our place in nature. We are no longer justified in thinking of ourselves as the crown of creation. We now understand that we are just one species among others, and we must ask ourselves anew – with an open and critical mind and without bias – which values and principles should guide our interaction with non-human animals, and how we should weigh our interests against those of other animals.Recognizing this important trend in moral thinking, the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics invited me to edit a special issue on animal ethics. The interest was so great that one issue became two, of which this is the first. I am grateful to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for giving me the opportunity to serve as a guest editor, and for their assistance during the editing process. I also thank our contributors for choosing this journal to publish their excellent work, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.This, the first special issue on animal ethics contains the following five articles:Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) challenge the widely held belief that non-human animals are not included within the scope of the principles of justice, and suggest that the interests of non-human animals sometimes take precedence over the interests of human beings. The implications of their argument for our interaction with other animals are profound: E.g., it is a matter of justice and fairness to prevent avoidable and unnecessary animal suffering, rather than a mere matter of compassion.Eric X. Qi (“Special Relations, Special Obligations, and Speciesism”) develops an account of the moral significance of special relations, and uses it to argue for a modest form of speciesism that steers a middle ground between anti-speciesism and crude speciesism. Unlike anti-speciesists, he maintains that species co-membership grounds special moral obligations among the members of the same species. In contrast to crude speciesists, however, he holds that our special obligations to fellow human beings do not warrant that we always attach more weight to their interests than to the comparable interests of non-human animals.Yamikani Ndasaukaand Grivas M. Kayange (“Existence and Needs: A case for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals”) argue that the existentialist view that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals rests on a weak foundation. They consider a number of arguments that have been made in support of this view and conclude that none of them holds up to critical scrutiny. They then suggest that human beings and other animals in fact deserve equal moral consideration, and – drawing from Martin Heidegger and Abraham Maslow – ground that claim in two important commonalities between them.Sreetama Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency”) explains how the postmodern approach to animal ethics departs from the traditional approach, particularly its emphasis on the principles of neutrality, universality, and consistency, and draws attention to the pernicious hierarchy of domination that separates human beings from other animals. Building on the insights of postmodernism, she takes first steps towards a new, non-anthropocentric paradigm, in the hope to achieve a sustainable balance between human interests and the interests of non-human animals.Gabriel Vidal Quiñones (“Singerian Vegetarianism and the Limits of Utilitarianism: A path towards a Meaning Ethics”) takes a critical look at Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, and argues that the conceptual resources of utilitarianism only allow for an incomplete moral understanding of our relationship with other animals. What is lacking, he suggests, is an ethical vision. He argues that, without an ethical vision, human action threatens to degenerate into mere automatism without meaning. He proposes a “meaning ethics” that he thinks is better equipped to help us decide how we ought to treat other animals.I hope you, dear reader, will enjoy reading through this remarkable collection of articles as much as I enjoyed putting it together. Maybe you will even be inspired to do some thinking of your own about issues of animal ethics and put your thoughts down on paper. If so, I sincerely hope that you will choose the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics to publish your article.Warm regards and best wishes for the new year. (shrink)

Der Forschung gelaufig ist die Rede von einer ersten (5./4. Jh. v. Chr.) und der sog. Zweiten Sophistik (2. Jh. n. Chr). Aber auch die Literatur des Hellenismus und der fruhen Kaiserzeit kennt zahlreiche Sophisten. Der Sophist, verstanden als (schlechter) Lehrer und Redner, Gegenspieler des Philosophen oder Vertreter der griechischen Bildung, bildet deshalb den Dreh-und Angelpunkt der Beitrage, die Schlaglichter auf Orte, Methoden und Personen der Bildungsvermittlung werfen. Die Beitrage zeigen, wie pagane und judische Denker, Platoniker und Stoiker Bildung als (...) Weg zum richtigen Welt- und Gottesverstandnis verstehen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Fron, Marco Galli, Johann Goeken, Stefanie Holder, Alexandra Michalewski, Peter Scholz, Paul Schubert, Gregory E. Sterling, Werner Urbanz, Beatrice Wys. (shrink)

Der Mensch als Übender, als sich durch Übungen selbst erzeugendes Wesen - Rainer Maria Rilke hat den Antrieb zu solchen Exerzitien zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts in die Form gefaßt: "Du mußt dein Leben ändern." In seinem Plädoyer für die Ausweitung der Übungszone des einzelnen wie der Gesellschaft entwirft Peter Sloterdijk eine grundlegende und grundlegend neue Anthropologie. Den Kern seiner Wissenschaft vom Menschen bildet die Einsicht von der Selbstbildung alles Humanen. Seine Aktivitäten wirken unablässig auf ihn zurück: die Arbeit (...) auf den Arbeiter, die Kommunikation auf den Kommunizierenden, die Gefühle auf den Fühlenden. Es sind die ausdrücklich übenden Menschen, die diese Existenzweise am deutlichsten verkörpern: Bauern, Arbeiter, Krieger, Schreiber, Yogi, Rhetoren, Instrumentalvirtuosen oder Models. Ihre Trainingspläne und Höchstleistungen versammelt dieses Buch zu einer vergnüglich-instruktiven Lektüre von den Übungen, die erforderlich sind, ein Mensch zu sein. (shrink)

Die Idee der Toleranz führt in unserer liberalen Gesellschaft eine Art Doppelleben. Einerseits gibt es einen breiten öffentlichen Konsens darüber, dass Toleranz eine gute Sache ist. Andererseits haben die begrifflichen und normativen Paradoxien, die dem Toleranzkonzept offenbar inhärent sind, in der politischen Philosophie für Verwirrung gesorgt. In dieser Abhandlung verteidige und spezifiziere ich die Auffassung, dass Toleranz eine Kombination aus Ablehnung und Akzeptanz beinhaltet. Ich fokussiere mich vor allem auf die Akzeptanzkomponente, die bislang vernachlässigt worden ist. Diese Vernachlässigung erklärt einen (...) Großteil der Verwirrung, für die das Konzept der Toleranz gesorgt hat. Wenn wir einsehen, dass Akzeptanz den Verzicht auf besonders grausame oder gemeine Arten der Intervention meint, sollte klar sein, warum Toleranz moralisch geboten ist. Ich schließe mit einigen methodologischen Ausführungen dazu, wie die Toleranzproblematik angegangen werden sollte und wie nicht. (shrink)

The concept of hope is central to the work of the German philosopher Ernst Bloch, especially in his magnum opus, _The Principle of Hope_. The "speculative materialism" that he first developed in the 1930s asserts a commitment to humanity's potential that continued through his later work. In _The Privatization of Hope_, leading thinkers in utopian studies explore the insights that Bloch's ideas provide in understanding the present. Mired in the excesses and disaffections of contemporary capitalist society, hope in the Blochian (...) sense has become atomized, desocialized, and privatized. From myriad perspectives, the contributors clearly delineate the renewed value of Bloch's theories in this age of hopelessness. Bringing Bloch's "ontology of Not Yet Being" into conversation with twenty-first-century concerns, this collection is intended to help revive and revitalize philosophy's commitment to the generative force of hope. _Contributors_. Roland Boer, Frances Daly, Henk de Berg, Vincent Geoghegan, Wayne Hudson, Ruth Levitas, David Miller, Catherine Moir, Caitríona Ní Dhúill, Welf Schröter, Johan Siebers, Peter Thompson, Francesca Vidal, Rainer Ernst Zimmermann, Slavoj Žižek. (shrink)

The article starts from an examination of the authorship of the ‘Geleitwort’, the programmatic statement which appeared in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft when it came under new editors in 1904. Recently scholars have begun to view it as an important text by Max Weber recovered from obscurity, but this is a mistake. Examination of major contemporary works by Weber and Werner Sombart – the obvious co-author – as well as the first public disclosure of an entirely new MS. by Weber, (...) show that in all probability the text was drafted by Sombart and then revised fairly lightly by Weber. This story of a combined, if unequal, authorship leads into two broader seams of intellectual history: the relationship between Weber and Sombart, and the history of the Archiv as a journal. An unusual starting point thus casts fresh and unexpected light on some of the most central figures and episodes in German social science at the beginning of the 20th century, not least Weber's seminal essay on “Objectivity” in social science. ☆ This paper relies on intellectual interchange and the generosity of colleagues to a quite unusual degree. I note three particular debts: to Prof. Friedrich Lenger, for a copy of Sombart's important 1897 essay on ‘Social Scientific Journals’; to Prof. Guenther Roth for letter transcripts bearing on the Archiv from and to Edgar Jaffé, and for showing me in draft his ground-breaking work ‘Edgar Jaffé and Else von Richthofen: a biographical essay based on the family archive of Christopher Jeffrey’ [hereafter ‘Biographical Essay]; and to Dr. Edith Hanke and Prof. Rainer Lepsius (on behalf of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe). Dr. Hanke brought to my notice the existence of the MS. which I have called Weber's draft Editorial Notice (see §.IV below), and Prof. Lepsius then gave permission for me to see and to cite from this document. — Some abbreviations: AfSS for Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik; AfGS for Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik; Lebensbild for Marianne Weber, Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild [1926] (Tübingen, 1989); MWG for Max Weber Gesamtausgabe ed. Horst Baier et al. (Tübingen, 1984-). Letters by Weber within the MWG are cited as Briefe; ‘Nachlaß Max Weber’ for unpublished letters in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, VI. HA Nachlaß Max Weber. (shrink)

Bayle is famous for his defence of religious toleration. In this paper, I will call into question his main argument for toleration, his defence of the erring conscience. While it is often maintained that the argument is self-defeating, my claim will be more fundamental: His defence of the erring conscience does not even qualify as an argument for toleration in the first place, at least not for toleration as it is commonly understood. The argument has been misconceived by both Bayle (...) himself and his commentators. I will conclude by showing that this turns out to have positive effects on Bayle's other arguments for toleration, among which is a Lockean and a Rawlsian defence of toleration. (shrink)

Publishing a collection of fragments from a classical author is a risky business: the moment the book appears in print, it may already be outdated, as new fragments could have come to light. Or, in the words of Ecclesiasticus 18:7: ‘When a man hath done, then he beginneth; and when he leaveth off, then he shall be doubtful’. The same fate befell me shortly after the publication of my collection of fragments from Rufus of Ephesus' On Melancholy. Manfred Ullmann wrote (...) to me that the late Rainer Degen had discovered a new fragment; in the course of my research, I came across some relevant quotations in the Hippocratic Treatments by the tenth-century author aṭ-Ṭabarī; and recently, Klaus-Dietrich Fischer published two related fragments. The following short note contains these new fragments together with an English translation and commentary. At the end, I also offer some addenda and corrigenda, partly in light of the reviews that have since appeared. (shrink)

Volker Harlan, Rainer Rappman, Peter Schata – Plastica sociala. Materiale despre Joseph Beuys Editura IDEA, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, 159 p.

Die vorliegende Analyse setzt sich mit dem Vorwurf der gesellschaftlichen Irrelevanz von Peter Handkes Prosa auseinander. Anhand einer vergleichenden Interpretation von R. M. Rilkes Malte und P. Handkes Stunde soll die Unhaltbarkeit dieser These unter Beweis gestellt werden, insofern sich die Ich-Orientierung bei Handke im Gegensatz zu Rilkes letztlich streng solipsistischer Attitüde als eine im Gegeneffekt doch im Sozialbereich verankerte Subjektivität enthüllt.

Vom Hildegardis-Fest am 17. September 1997 bis zum September des darauffolgenden Jahres erstreckten sich im Gebiet zwischen Bermersheim und Eibingen und von Bingen bis Mainz die Feierlichkeiten zum 900-jahrigen Geburtsjubilaum Hildegards von Bingen. Die Verehrung der Volksheiligen aus dem Raum zwischen Nahe und Rhein hat auch in unserer Zeit zu vielfaltigen Veranstaltungen angeregt. Der Kongress stand unter dem Thema, das jetzt auch den Titel dieses Bandes hergibt, und fand vom 16. bis 21. Marz 1998 im Erbacher Hof statt.".

Das Buch beschAftigt sich mit psychologischen Theorien und mit empirischer Forschung in der Psychologie. Am Beispiel der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz von Festinger beschreibt und analysiert der Autor den Aufbau einer psychologischen Theorie, ihre Entwicklung im Zuge empirischer Forschungsprozesse und die wesentlichen Kennzeichen einer theorieorientierten experimentalpsychologischen Forschung. Diesen Betrachtungen liegt die strukturalistische Theorienkonzeption nach Sneed und StegmA1/4ller zugrunde - ein relativ neuer wissenschaftsphilosophischer Ansatz, der ursprA1/4nglich als non-statement view bezeichnet wurde. In diesem Rahmen werden insbesondere die Beziehungen zwischen Theorie und (...) Experiment sowie die Probleme der ValiditAt empirischer Untersuchungen neu analysiert. (shrink)

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents, (1) truth-conditions, and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth- conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.

Berkeley’s likeness principle is the claim that “an idea can be like nothing but an idea”. The likeness principle is intended to undermine representationalism: the view (that Berkeley attributes to thinkers like Descartes and Locke) that all human knowledge is mediated by ideas in the mind which represent material objects. Yet, Berkeley appears to leave the likeness principle unargued for. This has led to several attempts to explain why Berkeley accepts it. In contrast to ‘metaphysical’ and ‘epistemological’ interpretations available in (...) the literature, in this paper I defend a ‘conceptual’ interpretation. I argue that Berkeley accepts the likeness principle on the basis of (i) his commitment to the transparency of ideas, and (ii) his account of resemblance which he sets out in his works on vision. Thus, I provide an explanation for Berkeley’s reasons for accepting the likeness principle which, appropriately, focuses on his views concerning ideas and likeness. (shrink)

Introduction: the foundation of justice -- Practical reason and justifying reasons: on the foundation of morality -- Moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality : toward a theory of normativity after Kant -- Ethics and morality -- The justification of justice: Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's discourse theory in dialogue -- Political liberty: integrating five conceptions of autonomy -- A critical theory of multicultural toleration -- The rule of reasons: three models of deliberative democracy -- Social justice, justification, and power (...) -- The basic right to justification: toward a constructivist conception of human rights -- Constructions of transnational justice: comparing John Rawls's the law of peoples and Otfried Höffe's democracy in an age of globalisation -- Justice, morality, and power in the global context -- Toward a critical theory of transnational justice. (shrink)

Margaret Macdonald was at the institutional heart of analytic philosophy in Britain in the mid-twentieth century. Yet, her views on the nature of philosophical theories diverge quite considerably from those of many of her contemporaries. In this paper, I focus on her 1953 article ‘Linguistic Philosophy and Perception’, a provocative paper in which Macdonald argues that the value of philosophical theories is more akin to that of poetry or art than science or mathematics. I do so for two reasons. First, (...) because it reveals just how far Macdonald’s meta- philosophical views diverged from those of many of her contemporaries. Second, because the discussion in LPP pre-empts recent literature on the nature of philosophical inquiry and the efficacy of philosophical arguments. Indeed, Macdonald’s paper is just as likely to provoke discussion today as it was in the 1950s. (shrink)

Mental-threshold egalitarianism, well-known examples of which include Jeff McMahan’s two-tiered account of the wrongness of killing and Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights, divides morally considerable beings into equals and unequals on the basis of their individual mental capacities. In this paper, I argue that the line that separates equals from unequals is unavoidably arbitrary and implausibly associates an insignificant difference in empirical reality with a momentous difference in moral status. In response to these objections, McMahan has proposed the introduction (...) of an intermediate moral status. I argue that this move ultimately fails to address the problem. I conclude that, if we are not prepared to give up moral equality, our full and equal moral status must be grounded in a binary property that is not a threshold property. I tentatively suggest that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is such a property, and a plausible candidate. (shrink)